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Introduction: 
Selecting Out 
Cheaters
 
Humans and other ani-
mals practice multiple
forms of cooperation, or
‘reciprocal altruism’,
among genetically unre-
lated individuals of the
same species (T
 
RIVERS
 
1971). One answer to why
nonkin cooperate is de-
rived from the concepts
of ‘trade’ and ‘tradeoff’ in
economics and game the-
ory (A
 
XELROD
 
 1984, F
 
RANK
 
1988). If the benefit of be-
ing assisted outweighs the
cost of giving assistance,
then individuals who
practice mutual aid can
outproduce others who
don’t. For example, vam-
pire bats live in large, sta-
ble social groups and rec-
ognize one another by
voice. To survive, vampire
bats foray each night in search of a blood meal.
Chances of success are highly variable and a bat will
die if unfed for sixty hours. To reduce this variance
and prevent starvation, bats with blood-filled stom-
achs will regurgitate some of this valuable and hard-
to-get resource to other hungry bats. The best pre-
dictor of whether or not a bat will share with a
needy nonrelative is whether or not the nonrelative
has previously shared food (W
 
ILKINSON
 
 1984).
 Vampire bats may be able to recognize cheaters
during grooming, when they can best perceive
whose stomachs are most distended with food and
yet are not sharing. It is unclear, however, whether a
bat that fails to regurgi-
tate is recognized as a
‘cheater’ only by individ-
uals the bat has denied, or
acquires a ‘reputation’ as
a defector when other ‘co-
operators’ observe the
bat’s denial to those in
need. It is also unclear
whether cooperation is a
 
quid pro quo
 
 or “from each
according to its ability”,
whether cheaters recog-
nize the consequences of
their ‘defection’, and
whether cheaters or
would-be cheaters learn
from the ‘punishments’
meted out. 
A group of individuals
that always cooperated
would not likely survive
an invasion of cheaters,
unless the cooperators
could identify and ex-
clude the cheaters. Other-
wise, the cooperators
would be in effect subsi-
dizing cheaters at significant cost to themselves and
thus driving themselves to extinction. A group of
individuals that always cheated would not likely sur-
vive an invasion of cooperators that could reliably
discriminate cooperators from cheaters, because
cheaters would always be denied the resources that
cooperators obtained from one another. Detecting
cheaters usually carries some cost in time or energy
allotted to marking, monitoring and punishing or
defending against them. As a population tended to
full cooperation, the (selection) pressures to pay the
cost of detecting cheaters would lessen, but oppor-
tunities for cheaters to invade undetected would
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A Cheater–Detection Module?
 
Dubious Interpretations of the Wason Selection Task and Logic
 
People usually fail the W
 
ASON
 
 selection task, choos-
ing P and Q cases, when attempting to validate de-
scriptive rules having the form “If P, then Q”. Yet they
solve it, selecting P and not-Q cases, when validating
deontic rules of the form “If P, then must Q”. The
field of evolutionary psychology has overwhelmingly
interpreted deontic versions of the selection task in
terms of a naturally-selected, domain-specific social-
contract or cheating algorithm. This work has done
much to promote evolutionary psychology as an alter-
native to a mindblind sociobiology that ignores the
computational structure of cognitive mechanisms in
producing people’s behaviors. Nevertheless, evolu-
tion-minded researchers outside cognitive psychology
know little of the ample literature challenging this in-
terpretation and uncritically cite the ‘cheater–detec-
tion module’ as a key insight into human cognition.
Although a priori arguments for a specially evolved
cheater–detection module are plausible, the selection
task provides no direct evidence for such a module.
Adaptation, cheater–detection, logic, modularity,
relevance.
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thereby increase. As cheaters began succeeding, co-
operators would again have to evolve cheater–detec-
tors or die out. These antagonistic selection pressures
make it unlikely than any population involving in-
teractions between nonkin would consist wholly of
cooperators or cheaters.
In any event, cooperation could not work without
a cognitive system that directs an organism’s atten-
tion to information that could enable it to decide
whether or not it was being cheated (C
 
OSMIDES
 
/
T
 
OOBY
 
 1992). In humans, the opportunities for co-
operation and cheating can range over the exchange
of virtually any material or intellectual commodity,
including money, ideas, time and baseball cards.
Consequently, a human cognitive system for detect-
ing cheaters cannot be restricted to perceptions of
food intake and outake, but requires a more abstract
computational algorithm for representing the ‘ben-
efits’ and ‘costs’ that accrue to the exchange of any
‘good’. One such candidate algorithm for human co-
operation takes the form: “If Party A takes some ben-
efit from Party B, then Party A must pay back the cost
to Party B”. The corresponding algorithm for
cheater–detection would be: “A benefitted from, but
failed to pay the cost to, B”.
 
A Modular Interpretation of the 
Selection Task
 
In 1966, Peter W
 
ASON
 
 introduced a selection task to
study logical reasoning about conditionals that has
become the most widely used instrument for the
experimental exploration of the psychology of hu-
man reasoning. The task presents subjects with a
conditional rule in either a descriptive form (“If an
item has property 
 
P
 
, then it has property 
 
Q
 
”) or a
deontic form (“If an item has property 
 
P
 
, then it
should have property 
 
Q
 
”). A paradigm example of
the descriptive form is: “if there is a vowel on one
side of the card, then there is an odd number on
the other”. Four double-sided cards are placed on a
table so that the subject can see only one side of
each card, such as ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘1’ and ‘2’. The experi-
menter instructs the subject to indicate which of
the four cards must be turned over to find out
whether the rule is true or false. If the conditional
rule is interpreted in terms of formal logic, then
only the 
 
P
 
 card (‘A’) and the 
 
not-Q
 
 card (‘2’) need to
be turned over. Nevertheless, W
 
ASON
 
 and numer-
ous subsequent researchers found that, for such
“abstract” versions of the descriptive form of the
selection task, most subjects turn over the 
 
P
 
 card
(‘A’) and the 
 
Q
 
 card (‘1’). This seems to suggest that
ordinary human inference does not generally obey
the laws of propositional logic.
In deontological contexts that convey social obli-
gation, however, studies show that subjects often
perform ‘logically’. For example, subjects are asked
to imagine a policeman checking bars to see if bar-
goers obey the deontic conditional: “If you drink
alcohol, then you must be over twenty-one years of
age”. Suppose the policeman reads the cards “Beer”,
‘Coke’, ‘22 years’, ‘16 years’. In these situations, most
subjects choose the 
 
P
 
 card (“Beer”) and the 
 
not-Q
 
card (‘16 years’) (G
 
RIGGS
 
/C
 
OX
 
 1982). To obtain a gen-
uine deontic interpretation, the deontic rule has to
make sense. A ‘must’ formulation is only suggestive,
but neither necessary or sufficient. 
In another deontic task, subjects are asked to
imagine a worker who signs on with a firm under
assurance that: “If an employee works on the week-
end, then that person gets a day off”. The subject is
then asked to verify if the contract is upheld by se-
lecting from the following cards: “Worked Week-
end” (
 
P
 
), “Worked Only During Week” (
 
not-P
 
), “Got
Day off” (
 
Q
 
), “Did Not Get Day Off” (
 
not-Q
 
). Most
subjects ‘correctly’ pick the P and 
 
not-Q
 
 cards. But
when asked to take the perspective of the employer,
rather than the worker, most subjects pick the 
 
not-P
 
and 
 
Q
 
 cards (C
 
OSMIDES
 
 1989, G
 
IGERENZER
 
/H
 
UG
 
 1992,
M
 
ANTKELOW
 
/O
 
VER
 
 1991, P
 
OLITZER
 
/N
 
GUYEN
 
-X
 
UAN
 
1992, F
 
IDDICK
 
, C
 
OSMIDES
 
/T
 
OOBY
 
 2000). It is counter-
intuitive to conclude that the only logical answers
are those given from the worker’s perspective and
not the employer’s perspective. Intuitively, both per-
spectives seem equally rational and reasonable.
These results have led some to surmise that de-
ontic versions of the selection task differ from ab-
stract descriptive versions by giving practical con-
tent to ‘pragmatic schema’, and that humans are
naturally more attuned to reasoning with prag-
matic schema than with abstract logic (C
 
HENG
 
/H
 
O-
LYOAK
 
/N
 
ISBETT
 
/O
 
LIVER
 
 1986). According to Leda
C
 
OSMIDES
 
, however, ‘content-effects’ and ‘prag-
matic schema’ are nebulous concepts that can argu-
ably be reduced to a simple evolutionary impera-
tive, “find the cheater”. On her account, the
deontic tasks are often naturally interpreted as so-
cial contracts. Verifying the violation of a social
contract requires picking the ‘benefit taken’ and
‘cost not paid’ cards, whatever the logical form of
the contract. For G
 
IGERENZER
 
/H
 
UG
 
 (1992), even the
notion of a social-contract algorithm is too broad;
rather, their studies in perspective-shift suggest an
evolved, domain-specific adaptation for a ‘module’
dedicated to discovery of cheating. 
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An Evolution-Sensitive Alternative
 
Perhaps the most forceful challenge to the selection
task as evidence of a cheater–detection module
comes from studies by S
 
PERBER
 
/C
 
ARA
 
/G
 
IROTTO
 
(1995). Their proposal is that performance on 
 
all
 
versions of the selection task—descriptive as well as
deontic—can be readily explained by universal,
cross-domain forms of reasoning that operate in
conjunction with context-specific aspects of the
task. These cross-domain processes are the same as
those routinely used by all humans (excepting seri-
ous pathology) in ordinary linguistic communica-
tion (S
 
PERBER
 
/W
 
ILSON
 
 1986). The general idea is that
individuals attempt to ascertain the relevance of
any new information within a context of pre-exist-
ing knowledge and expectancies (E
 
VANS
 
 1989). 
S
 
PERBER
 
 et al. experimentally manipulated the log-
ical form, propositional content and pragmatic con-
text of the selection task to test effects on judgments
of relevance and card choice. If the new information,
together with the background context, leads to new
beliefs, or to rejection of old beliefs, then the infor-
mation is relevant to that context. Subjects are intu-
itively confident in their spontaneous judgments of
relevance and choose cards in conformity with those
judgments.
Relevance is a matter of degree and involves cog-
nitive tradeoffs. The greater the cognitive effects re-
sult form processing the information (e.g., the more
the number of new beliefs or the wider the range of
potential inferences), the greater the information’s
relevance to the individual; but the greater the cog-
nitive effort needed to produce the effects (e.g., the
more time it takes to process the information), the
lesser its relevance on that occasion. For example, a
student might be informed that: (1) classes start in
early September, (2) classes start the morning after
Labor Day, (3) classes start no more than thirty-six
hours following the start of the last national holiday
in summer. In most contexts, (2) is more relevant
than one, because (2) implies (1) but not vice versa
and so (2) has more associated inferences than (1).
Statement (2) is also more relevant than (3) because
it takes less time to process and understand (2), al-
though (2) and (3) are inferentially equivalent. The
resultant cognitive balance usually allows the com-
municator to formulate, and the auditor to compre-
hend whatever information the communicator’s
formulation is intended to convey, in a relatively
rapid, economical and efficient way.
S
 
PERBER
 
 et al. argue that subjects in the selection
task behave no differently than people in ordinary
communicative settings. Subjects attend to the most
relevant information that is being made available to
them by the experimenter, and attempt to interpret
it within a context of assumptions that will maxi-
mize this relevance. When the experimenter pre-
sents subjects with the abstract version of the selec-
tion task, and a conditional of the form 
 
If P then Q
 
,
the first thing subjects try to do is simply find out
whether or not there are relevant instances of 
 
P
 
 and
 
Q
 
. If there weren’t, then the fact that the experi-
menter mentioned them at all would be an apparent
violation of the tacit assumption that underlies all
human communication: convey information in a
relevant way. From a purely logical standpoint, sub-
jects appear to be initially interpreting the experi-
ment not as a problem of falsifying the universally
quantified statement, “For all x (
 
P
 
x 
 
→
 
 
 
Q
 
x)”, but as
verifying the existentially quantified statement,
“There exists x (
 
P
 
x & 
 
Q
 
x)”. Moreover, if the subjects
interpret the rule as applying only to the four cards
in front of them, rather than to the task or cards in
general, then subjects interpreting the conditional
as an existentially quantified statement can falsify
the rule just by turning over the 
 
P
 
 and 
 
Q
 
 cards in
order to discomfirm that there is a 
 
P
 
 & 
 
Q
 
 card.
When the consequent is negated, however, the
majority of subjects perform ‘logically’. Take the
statement: “If there is a vowel on one side of the card,
then there is not an even number on the other side”.
Subjects pick the 
 
P
 
 card (‘Vowel’) and the 
 
not-Q
 
 card
(‘Even Number’). In general, when subjects are pre-
sented abstract versions of the selection task in the
form 
 
If P then Q
 
, “most subjects choose the matching
cards 
 
P
 
 and 
 
Q
 
 and thus apparently solve the [logical]
problem” (E
 
VANS
 
 1989, p57). S
 
PERBER
 
 et al. argue that
in such cases, subjects reconstruct the assumption
that the rule denies, namely, that there are cases of
 
P & Q
 
: “This interpretation of the rule as a denial
causes them to make the correct selection” (S
 
PERBER
 
et al. 1995, p79). 
What is different about deontic contexts is that
the pragmatic context shifts the emphasis from rule
verification to rule violation. This creates a situa-
tion much like the negative-consequent version of
the descriptive task, except that in deontic and the-
matic tasks, the content and the context—rather
than any explicit negation in the consequent—in-
dicate what assumption is being denied by the rule.
For example, the fact that a person is over twenty-
one years of age and drinks alcohol is not very in-
formative to most people in our society. But the
context (e.g., that there is a police officer checking)
raises the possibility that there might be underage
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drinkers. In this context, underage drinking would
have cognitive effects; therefore, it would be more
relevant to interpret the information as 
 
forbidding
 
underage drinking: not-(
 
Drinks Alcohol
 
 & 
 
not-Over
21
 
). In general, the logic form of subjects’ interpre-
tation of deontic versions of the selection tasks is:
not-[There exists x (
 
P
 
x & 
 
not-Q
 
x)]. 
Notice that the same logical interpretation could
arise in contexts that do not involve social contracts
or cheating detection. For example, take the state-
ment: “If a person wins a professional boxing match,
then that person must be sober”. The prediction is
that subjects would pick the P card (‘Wins Match’)
and the not-Q card (‘Drunk’) because information
concerning a winning but drunk professional boxer
more likely has cognitive effects than information
concerning a successful sober boxer” [***opening pa-
renthesis?***] (cf. ALMOR/SLOMAN 1996). 
FIDDICK/COSMIDES/TOOBY (2000) suggest that cer-
tain conditionals used in selection-task format
might be interpreted in terms of a fitness-preserving
hazardous-management module rather than a
cheater–detection or social contract module. The
general algorithm for a fitness-preserving condi-
tional is: “If in a hazardous situation that is costly to
fitness, then take the benefit of precaution”. FIDDICK
et al. predict (and experimentally confirm predic-
tions) that the majority of subjects will pick the P
(‘Hazardous Situation’) and not-Q (‘No Precaution’)
cards.
FIDDICK et al. deny that relevance theory can reli-
ably predict patterns of performance on deontic ver-
sions of the selection task, such as perspective shifts
involving cheater–detection or fitness-preservation.
For example, take the rule: “If you make poison
darts, then you may use the rubber gloves”. In the
Privilege condition, subjects are primed to take the
perspective of an anthropologist checking to see if
tribespeople are abusing the privilege of wearing
gloves. In this condition, subjects tend to make the
apparently illogical not-P and Q selection. In the Risk
condition, subjects take the perspective of an an-
thropologist checking if tribespeople are unduly
risking their lives. In this condition, subjects make
the logical P and not-Q selection. 
Fiddick et al. argue that relevance theory must
hold that either the rule is pragmatically awkward,
or it is not. But if the rule is pragmatically awkward,
then subjects should pick the illogical not-P and Q
for both conditions. And if the rule is not pragmat-
ically awkward, then subjects should pick the logi-
cal P and not-Q for both. In brief, relevance theory
is seemingly faced with two contradictory out-
comes: “because of its reliance upon logical formu-
lae, relevance theory is placed in the unenviable
position of having to invoke contradictory princi-
ples”. As an alternative to relevance theory, FIDDICK
et al. suggest that two different domain-specific
schema are operating. In the Privilege condition,
the anthropologist is using a cheater–detection device
to see if tribespeople are abusing a privilege. In the
Risk version, the anthropologist is using a hazard-
management device to see if tribespeople are unduly
risking their lives. 
FIDDICK et al. fail to consider that, from the stand-
point of relevance theory, both conditions may be
taken as implying reciprocity:
A. Explicitly: For all x [P(costly risk) x → should
take Q (precautionary benefit) x]
B. This implies: For all x [Q(precautionary benefit)
x → should take P(costly risk) x]
In the Privilege condition, subjects look for a Vio-
lation of B:
Not-{there exists [Q(Benefit) x & not-P(Cost) x]}
In the Risk condition, subjects look for a Violation
of A:
Not-{there exists [P(Cost) x & not-Q(Benefit) x]}
In another experiment, FIDDICK et al. present a
bartering situation where people cannot express con-
ditionals of the form “if P then Q”. A farmer from
one tribe nevertheless understands gestures from
people in the other tribe indicating “We want pota-
toes” and he gestures back in ways that the people
form the other tribe understand as “I want corn”.
The argument against relevance theory is that “I
want P/ we want Q” does not work explicitly on log-
ical form. Because relevance theory supposedly
works only on logical form, relevance theory can’t
explain the results. But as FIDDICK et al. note them-
selves, surface form may differ from underlying log-
ical form. Relevance theory makes no claim that sur-
face form and logical form are isomorphic. Nor is
such an isomorphism to be expected from the study
of language. In syntactic theory, for instance, the
command “Eat!”, when understood as an imperative
in English, entails two arguments that are absent in
the statement’s surface form but obligatorily present
in its underlying logical form, namely, a subject and
an object.
From the standpoint of relevance theory, the sur-
face form of the barter, A, may be interpreted as im-
plying the logical forms, B and C:
A. Explicit form: P (farmer give potatoes)/Q (tribe
give corn)
B. Implicit form: For all x [P(farmer’s potatoes) x →
ought give Q (tribe’s corn) x]
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C. This further implies: For all x [Q(tribe’s corn) x →
ought give P(farmer’s potatoes) x]
So, when asked to indicate when the farmer is
cheating, subjects interpret this to mean that there
is a Violation of C:
Not-{there exists [Q(tribe gives) x & not-P(farmer
gives) x]}
When asked to indicate when other tribespeople
are cheating there is a Violation of B:
Not-{there exists [P(farmer gives) x & not-Q(tribe
gives) x]}
Leda COSMIDES and her colleagues are right to
point out that interpretation of reasoning tasks in-
volve various content-dependent algorithms that
may have evolutionary import. As another exam-
ple, consider the statement: “if a heavy object is
projected up into the air up, then that object must
come down”. Arguably, subjects could invoke yet
another domain-specific algorithm, a ‘folkphysics
module’ (cf. SPELKE/PHILLIPS/WOODWARD 1995). It is
unclear what module, if any, would cover selections
for the following statement: “If a person wins a
multimillion dollar lottery, then that person must
be happy/sad”. No cheating or hazard appears to be
involved, although interpretation may involve
evolution-linked affect schema. 
A relevance-based interpretation of the WASON
task does not require a strictly non-modular inter-
pretation, such as interpretations that draw on men-
tal-model theory or semantic networking. Neither
does a relevance-based interpretation preclude the
possibility of a cheater–detection module. Rather,
the selection task evidence is simply better explained
in terms of relevance than in terms of cheater detec-
tion. Relevance-guided comprehension may itself be
evolutionarily specialized as a ‘meta-representation
module’ (SPERBER 1994). But theoretical claims and
empirical evidence for relevance-guided modularity
are independent of claims about cheater–detection.
Logic: Another Dubious Cheater 
Catcher
In a recent essay, SPERBER (in press) turns the argu-
ment by COSMIDES and colleagues almost on its
head. He proposes that some kind of argumenta-
tive logic is part of a naturally-selected adaptation
that arose during an evolutionary arms race be-
tween communicators attempting to persuade
(and deceive if need be) and audiences trying to
evaluate messages as truthful or not. In the com-
munication arms race, sophistry contributed as
much as honesty to this adaptation for persuasion-
and-coherence-checking. It is a nice a story, but so
far just a story. 
Historically, the formalization of deductive logic
began with Aristotle, who sought an effective form
of argumentation as a rhetorical device to parry the
sophists and promote a better, scientific analysis of
evidential relationships. The ensuing formalization
was more than just a standardization of folk reason-
ing. It subtly but profoundly changed the use of
everyday terms, such as ‘if’, ‘and’, ‘or’, and of words
indicating inferential relationships, such as ‘there-
fore’, ‘since’, ‘nonetheless’. In doing so it created
counterintuitive truth tables for material implica-
tion. Thus, if the antecedent is false, the whole
statement is true. Ordinarily, folk would probably
conclude that the statement is indeterminate. True,
if you put gold in aqua regia it either dissolves or
doesn’t (here folk intuition and formal logic agree).
But if you don’t put gold in aqua regia to begin with,
then an ordinary intuition is that there’s no argu-
ment possible. SPERBER points out (personal com-
munication, 2001) that at least some cases of the
antecedent being false and the whole statement be-
ing true seem to be amenable to ordinary intuition:
for example, so-called Dutch conditionals (“If
you’re right, then I’m the Pope—or Dutch”). Nev-
ertheless, logically, all such statements must be
equally coherent—and they aren’t.
Moreover, formal logic makes no distinction be-
tween ecologically valid and invalid reasoning. For
example, the proposition “All ravens are black”, has
both an intuitive and formal relationship to evi-
dence that bears on its truth, such as verifying that
anything identified as a raven is indeed black. But
the formally equivalent proposition, “All non-
black things are non-ravens”, has little pertinence
for any real-world process of verification or eviden-
tiary evaluation (if would be absurd and infinitely
time consuming to actually go out and see if all
things that are not black are indeed not ravens).
Finally, if logic is an adaptation for persuasion
and cheater-detection, it’s a pretty weak one. The
advertising industry employs other types of reason-
ing and reflection on evidentiary relationships that
side steps or easily overrides logic (e.g., you hair has
protein, our shampoo has protein, therefore our
shampoo is good for your hair). And, as Doug ME-
DIN notes (personal communication, 2001), per-
fume readily carries the day over argumentative dis-
plays of coherence, if circumstances are right, no
matter how coherent the argument.
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Conclusion: No Multiplication of 
Modules Beyond Evolutionary Necessity
If selection-task performance varies according to
contexts that differentially draw upon existential
verification, cheater detection, fitness preservation,
folkphysics, affect programs or general encylopedic
knowledge, then it is difficult to see how the selec-
tion task disambiguates or privileges any particular
domain-specific mode of processing. The advantage
of relevance theory over other accounts of the selec-
tion task is that relevance theory applies predictably
to all versions of the selection task, without denying
or privileging the effects of additional domain-spe-
cific competencies in any given context: “compre-
hension mechanisms and domain-specific mecha-
nisms jointly contribute to subjects’ performance,
but… their effects are, as things stand, confounded”
(SPERBER et al. 1995, p88). 
The selection task mobilizes various information
processing devices at the interface between our rele-
vance-guided system of comprehension and any
number of other task-specific
modules. As our ability to
identify modular systems be-
comes more secure, evidence
of activity at the interface will
undoubtedly add detail and
refinement to our understand-
ing of how modular mecha-
nisms function and interact.
But as with the interaction be-
tween the language faculty and various other cogni-
tive systems, the interface is not the place to begin
to understand modularity (CHOMSKY 2000).
Finally, the counter proposal that logic itself
emerged as a module for coping with an evolution-
ary arms race between persuasion and cheater-detec-
tion also lacks independent support (say, of the kind
that could be garnered for an emotion-based alter-
native). In general, I think that mental modules
should be invoked as explanations only when inde-
pendently converging arguments for modularity
can be sustained. This could include evidence for:
cross-cultural universality, early and rapid ontoge-
netic acquisition, ease and rapidity of cultural trans-
mission, hyperactivity and difficulty in inhibiting
operation even in the face of contrary instruction,
selective cerebral localization or impairment, evolu-
tionary analogies, functional phylogenetic homolo-
gies, imperfect but ecologically performative design
(ATRAN 1998, 2001). These are not necessary and suf-
ficient criteria for establishing modularity, only an
imperfect but generally productive community of
heuristics. This somewhat
parallels the cautious strategy
that George WILLIAMS (1966)
introduced with respect to the
concept of adaptation in evo-
lution, and which has led to
substantial progress in under-
standing evolutionary process
and structure.
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